The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is recommending the federal government take a closer look at uncertified vessels after the Titan submersible imploded on a descent to the Titanic wreck nearly three years ago.
The board released a report Wednesday examining the disaster that killed all five people on board, including Stockton Rush, the chief executive of OceanGate Inc., the Washington-based company that owned the small submersible.
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Transport Canada knew the uncertified vessel was operating out of St. John’s, N.L., but the department did not oversee those operations, leaving its occupants at risk, the federal investigation concluded.
It also found that several other government agencies knew about the Titan’s dives to the Titanic, but the information they shared with each other — and with Transport Canada — was limited.
“A lot of these government departments had pieces of the puzzle, they knew about certain aspects of OceanGate’s operations in Canada — and these departments include Transport Canada,” Yoan Marier, chair of the federal safety board, said in an interview.
“However, nobody could put all the pieces of the puzzle together.”
The Titan went missing on June 18, 2023, as it descended to the remains of the Titanic, which sank on April 15, 1912. The famous wreck sits on the ocean floor about 700 kilometres south of St. John’s, in waters nearly four kilometres deep. The Titan’s support crew lost contact with the submersible about an hour and 45 minutes into its voyage.
The disappearance prompted a frantic search involving coast guard and military agencies from the United States and Canada. Pieces of the Titan were found about four days later, about 300 metres off the bow of the Titanic.
OceanGate often touted Titan’s unorthodox carbon-fibre hull, which was cylindrical rather than the standard sphere. The design was not “classed,” meaning it wasn’t certified by an independent third party to ensure it was conceived, constructed and tested according to safety standards.
The safety board’s report said OceanGate had no idea how long the hull would hold up under repeated dives to the bottom of the Atlantic and the systems it had to test the hull’s integrity were flawed or mismanaged.
Jason Melvin, a senior marine investigator with the board, said OceanGate’s company culture likely prevented any improvements.
“There was a little bit of group think that was going on,” Melvin said in an interview. “If there was a safety issue brought up, if it wasn’t aligned with the management, it was usually negatively perceived.”
The Titan began diving to the Titanic in 2021, with base operations in St. John’s. Transport Canada was aware but had no idea the sub was not registered with any flag state, and thus not beholden to any jurisdiction’s laws or regulations, according to the safety board’s report.
Transport Canada never contacted OceanGate to ask about Titan’s safety standards, nor did it send officials to have a look at the sub, the safety board said.
“The Titan did not receive any oversight from Transport Canada,” the report said. “The investigation found that the lack of regulatory oversight to identify safety deficiencies resulted in increased risk to those involved in the Titan’s operations.”
The board recommended the department come up with a system to determine whether an uncertified vessel poses a safety risk and then monitor that vessel more closely. The move would make sea travel safer for thousands of other small uncertified vessels operating in Canada, Marier said.
“We found through this investigation, and also previous investigations … that some small vessels can go through their entire life cycle without ever being inspected by a Transport Canada inspector,” he said.
The Transportation Safety Board launched its investigation the day after the wreck of the Titan was discovered. Melvin estimated at least 30 people were involved. The report makes six key recommendations about oversight, standards and safety management, including that Transport Canada push for mandatory international standards for designing, building and operating submersibles.
Marier said the board provided Transport Canada with a briefing on the report before it was released publicly; the department has 90 days to respond.
This report by The Canadian Press was first published June 17, 2026.









